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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Federal Power Commission Does Not Have Jurisdiction 
Over the Sale of a Developed Leasehold Interest of Gas 
in Formation-Marr v. FPC 
• 
Independent gas producers1 erected producing wells upon cer-
tain land to extract leased mineral interests. This development of 
the leasehold2 supplied geological information from which the 
amount of gas reserves was estimated. The gas leasehold was then 
sold to Texas Eastern Transmission Company, an interstate pipe-
line company that sought additional reserves. Texas Eastern applied 
to the Federal Power Commission for a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity to connect its transportation system to the 
field.3 The FPC asserted jurisdiction over the sale of the leasehold 
in order to investigate the cost aspects of the transaction. Because 
the details of the sale appeared to adversely affect the ultimate 
price of gas to the consumer, the FPC refused to grant the requested 
certificate." On appeal, held, the Federal Power Commission does 
not have jurisdiction over the sale of a developed leasehold interest 
of gas in formation.15 Marr v. FPC, 33 U.S. L. WEEK 2074 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 8, 1964). 
The Natural Gas Act6 is applicable to the "sale in interstate 
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consump-_ 
tion,"7 but it expressly exempts the business of "production or 
gathering" from FPC jurisdiction.8 The ultimate classification of a 
transaction into one category or the other is left to the FPC and the 
judiciary. At present, a direct sale of natural gas to an interstate 
pipeline is within the jurisdiction of the FPC; it is not part of 
production and gathering.9 But, the sale of an undeveloped leasehold 
1. An "independent gas producer" produces, gathers, processes, and sells natural 
gas, but neither transports it in interstate commerce nor is affiliated with any interstate . 
pipeline company. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 547 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1954). 
2. Development of a leasehold consists of drilling wells and bringing them into 
production. An area remains undeveloped if production is not obtained, even though 
exploratory or discovery wells are drilled. WILLIAMS Be MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 
61 (1957). 
!I. Extension of facilities for the interstate transportation or sale of natural gas 
requires approval by the FPC through the issuance of a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity. Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958). 
4. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 249, 257-58 (1963). 
5. "Gas in formation" refers to gas situated in fault traps or other natural geological 
formations beneath the ground. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 93. 
6. 52 Stat. 821 (19118), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1958). 
7. Natural Gas Act§ l(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958). 
8. Ibid, 
9. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 547 U.S. 672 (1954). Commentators, prior 
to the Phillips decision, erroneously, but almost unanimously, believed that FPC as-
sertion of jurisdiction over this transaction would not be sustained because Congress 
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is an aspect of production and gathering and, therefore, not subject 
to Commission control.10 The transaction in the present case 
appears to lie between these two areas.11 
Several arguments may be advanced to support FPC jurisdic-
tion over this sale of a developed leasehold. First, the financial 
aspects of the transaction closely resemble those of a direct sale 
of natural gas by the independent producer to the interstate pipe-
line.12 The similarity between this conveyance and a direct sale of 
gas, over which the FPC has jurisdiction, suggests it would be 
illogical to deny FPC jurisdiction over this transaction. Second, 
the FPC can always regulate this business activity indirectly. 
Having jurisdiction over interstate transportation facilities, the 
FPC can issue or deny certificates of public convenience and 
necessity for pipeline facilities leading to the wells from which 
the company is to obtain gas if the price involved in the original 
transaction is determined to be excessive.13 This is true even when 
the original transaction is clearly outside the Commission's juris-
had not intended the economic repercussions in the industry that would follow such 
a move. E.g., Berger &: Krash, The Status of the Independent Producers Under the 
Natural Gas Act, 80 TEXAs L. REv. 29 (1951); Kulp, The Federal Natural Gas Act, 5 
OKLA. L. REv. 128 (1952); 59 YALE L.J. 1468 (1950). But see, Comment, 17 u. CHI, 
L. REv. 479 (1950); 4 MIAMI L.Q. 233 (1950). Post-Phillips discussions have been very 
critical of the holding. E.g., Fulbright, The FPC Gas Producer Exemption Is in the 
Consumer's Interest, 57 PUB. Um.. FOR.T. 18 (1956); Comment, 40 CoRNELL L.Q, 828 
(1955); Comment, 1954 ILI.. L.F. 509; 25 FORDHAM L. REv. 874 (1956); 44 GEO. L.J. 695 
(1956); 8 VAND. L. REv. 142 (1954). But see Durfee, Wisconsin and the Phillips Case, 
55 PUB. Um.. FORT, 70 (1955); 54 CoLuM. L REv. 1149 (1954). For judicial development 
of the holding of the Phillips decision, see note 17 infra. 
IO. FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 887 U.S. 498 (1949). 
11. Later in the same year, the FPC again held that it had jurisdiction in a case 
factually similar to the principal case. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 80 F.P.C. 759 
(1963). 
12. For example, in a direct sale of gas the total price is determined by multiplying 
the specific volume by an accepted price per unit of volume. In this transaction, the 
same price specificity was achieved by periodic redeterminations of the gas reserves 
and adjustments in the price per unit of volume. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 
F.P.C. 249, 254 (1968). 
18. Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 824 (1988), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) 
(1958). In addition, the FPC can condition certification of new pipeline facilities on 
the price to be paid the independent producer for the gas. Natural Gas Act § 7(e), 
52 Stat. 824 (1988), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 
149 (5th Cir. 1961). Unfortunately, the necessity for agreement between the company 
and the Commission on the conditions for the issuance of a conditional certificate and 
the consequent construction of the pipeline facilities conflicts with the providing of 
adequate service to the public. Hence, it would seem that the Commission would be 
in a less powerful bargaining position on the issue of the producer's price when its 
only statutory authority relates to the certification of facilities than would be the case 
if it could certify the construction of the pipeline with minimum delay and then 
exercise direct rate-making power as between the producer and the pipeline. Cf. note 
15 infra. During the rate proceeding, the Commission would have the power to order 
refunds of overcharges occasioned by the producer's price and passed on to consumers 
by the pipeline company. Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 52 Stat. 822 (1988), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 717c(e) (Supp. V, 1964). 
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diction.14 But this indirect control lends itself to evasive activities 
by the pipelines, which in turn require time-consuming counter-
maneuvers by the FPC. Hence, indirect control is probably less 
effective and efficient-or at least thought by the FPC to be less 
effective and efficient-than direct control.15 Since the FPC can 
already exercise ultimate control over this situation, it can be 
argued that such control should be as direct and efficient as possi-
ble. Finally, there is a general trend toward expansion of FPC 
regulation over the independent gas producer. It began with 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin16 and has since continued to 
expand,17 with no parallel extension of the exemption for produc-
tion and gathering. 
FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.,18 however, casts authori-
tative doubt on the assertions of jurisdiction by the FPC over the 
transaction in the principal case. There it was held that a sale of an 
undeveloped leasehold is within the express exemption to FPC 
jurisdiction. Language in that opinion indicated that all activity 
involving leases might fall within the express exemption,19 and 
this language formed the basis of decision in the principal case.20 
However, the Panhandle case can be distinguished from the prin-
cipal case because it involved an undeveloped, rather than a de-
veloped, leasehold.21 If the sale of undeveloped leases were within 
14. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961). 
15. The need to service consumers precludes a continuing battle between the 
FPC and a pipeline over prices when the FPC's statutory authority is only to reject 
those prices suggested by the transporter. Natural Gas Act § 4(a), 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1958). See Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 
249, 256 (1963). 
16. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). 
17. FPC jurisdiction has been upheld in the following situations: (1) sales made 
by a producer to an extraction plant that resells the processed residue gas, Deep South 
Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957); (2) sales made to an extraction plant that 
processes the gas and returns it to the producer, who then sells it to an interstate pipe-
line company, Argo Oil Corp., 15 F.P.C. 601 (1955); (3) sales of gas not transmitted in-
terstate until after being stored underground for some time at a place removed from 
the point of sale, Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1957); (4) gas sold 
in the wellhead before reaching the final regulating valve controlled by the buyer, 
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1959). See Mosburg, Regulation of 
the Independent Producer by the Federal Power Commission, 16 OKLA. L. REv. 249 
(196!1); Comment, Federal Regulation of Producer's Price Under the Natural Gas Act, 
9 KAN. L. REv. 4!11 (1961); Comment, Federal Control Over the Independent Gas 
Producer, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 690 (1957). 
18. 337 U.S. 498 (1949). See text accompanying note 27 infra. 
19. "We now adhere to this natural and clear meaning of the words and their 
obvious expression of congressional intent. Of course leases are an essential part of 
production." Id. at 505. (Emphasis added.) 
20. Principal case at 2075. 
21. Although other distinctions were suggested by the FPC in the principal case, 
that between developed and undeveloped leaseholds is the only one having apparent 
legal merit. The other distinctions were addressed to the trend of authority in the 
area, to the retention by the seller of certain mineral rights, production payments, and 
management of the field, and to the fact that the gas in Panhandle was destined for 
• 
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FPC jurisdiction, the FPC could conceivably regulate the sale of 
all property that possibly contains gas in formation that might 
be ultimately resold in interstate commerce; but, the distinction 
between developed and undeveloped leaseholds would overcome 
the fear of such extensive bureaucratic control over the price of 
general property transactions.22 This distinction also preserves some 
meaning for the statutory exemption to FPC jurisdiction because 
it permits the continued applicability of the express exemption 
to the physical aspects of production and gathering. Distinguishing 
developed from undeveloped leaseholds has the additional value 
of not diluting the FPC's ability to carry out the aim of the Natural 
Gas Act-the safeguarding of the public interest.23 
Although the above distinction appears to have some practical 
value, independent gas producers could condition the sale of un-
developed leaseholds upon the discovery of gas in paying quanti-
ties, and the price could be adjusted as the volume was ascertained. 
Such a sale would accomplish the same economic purpose as the 
sale of a developed leasehold, and yet, applying the distinction 
between developed leaseholds and undeveloped leaseholds, the 
transaction would be outside FPC jurisdiction; it would require 
a strained construction to fit the sale of an undeveloped leasehold 
within the statutory term "sale in interstate commerce of natural 
gas."24 The FPC would then be forced to rely on the less effective 
indirect control that can be exercised upon transactions outside 
its jurisdiction.25 The facility with which the producers could 
utilize this distinction to avoid direct FPC control diminishes its 
value.26 
The FPC may prefer to argue, in defense of its claim of juris-
diction, that Panhandle should be overruled, rather than distin-
guished. This argument might be favorably received because there 
are indications that the present Supreme Court would not extend 
the production and gathering exemption as far as did the majority 
intrastate commerce. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 249, 255 (196!1). This 
latter fact, however, did not form any part of the holding of the Panhandle Court. 
22. This fear was expressed by FPC Commissioner Woodward in his dissenting 
opinion in Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 30 F.P.C. 759, 771 (1963). 
23. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954). Accord, FPC 
v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil 
Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960). 
24. Natural Gas Act § l(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) 
(1958). 
25. See note 15 supra. 
26. The propensity of producers and pipelines to avoid direct FPC control is 
amply demonstrated by noting the activity of Texas Eastern in the principal transac-
tion. At first, there was a direct sale of gas to Texas Eastern. When it became apparent 
that the FPC was going to question the price of the transaction by asserting jurisdiction, 
the form of the transaction took the shape of a sale of a leasehold in order to avoid 
direct FPC price control. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 249, 250•51 (196!1) . 
• 
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in the Panhandle decision.27 It was, perhaps, this prospect of reinter-
pretation of legislative intent that prompted the FPC to assert juris-
diction at this particular time. 
The foregoing discussion of the "legal" aspects of the problem as 
articulated by the judiciary indicates that the power asserted by 
the FPC would probably be sustained on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, with Panhandle being either distinguished or overruled. 
However, other considerations indicate that the FPC may have 
chosen an inopportune time to assert jurisdiction over the sa~ of 
developed leaseholds of gas in formation. Congress has been dis-
turbed by past developments resulting in the expansion of FPC 
control over the independent producer. When the FPC indicated 
in 1948 that it was going to assert a broader jurisdiction, resulting 
in more direct control over the independent producers,28 Congress 
responded with a bill which would have arrested the growth of 
FPC jurisdiction over such producers.29 But, that enactment was 
vetoed by President Truman in 1950.30 After the Phillips decision 
in 1954, congressional resentment of what it considered to be a 
mistaken conception of the aim of the production and gathering 
exemption81 manifested itself in another bill designed to restrict 
FPC jurisdiction.82 President Eisenhower vetoed that bill in 1956.88 
27. In Panhandle there was a dissent by Mr. Justice Black in which Mr. Justice 
Douglas concurred. Their basic position is that the exemption must be construed nar-
rowly because effective FPC control, as contemplated by the Natural Gas Act, requires 
jurisdiction over this type of transaction. FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 
498, 516 (1949) (dissenting opinion). This view would probably be supported by a 
majority of the present Court. In addition to Justices Black and Douglas, Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren has indicated his support of a construction of the Natural Gas Act 
favoring restrictive federal control of the natural gas industry. FPC v. Transcontinental 
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. I (1961). Mr. Justice Brennan has endorsed similar views. 
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963); Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960). To total a majority, Mr. Justice Gold-
berg can be counted by virtue of his concern for the protection of the consuming 
public by the appropriate federal regulatory agency. See SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1140, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 567, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. (1949). 
29. H.R. 1758, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). This bill would have specifically 
exempted from FPC jurisdiction any arm's-length sale made by a producer prior to 
the delivery of the gas to interstate transmission facilities. 
30. H.R. Doc. No. 555, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). The veto was designed to protect 
the public by preventing excessive and unreasonable prices in the gas industry. 
31. H.R. REP. No. 992, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. REP. No. 1219, 84th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1955). 
!!2. H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). This legislation defined "sale in in-
terstate commerce of natural gas" to exclude sales made prior to the entrance of the 
gas into interstate transmission facilities. For an excellent detailed case study of this 
bill, see READ, MAcDONALD &: FORDHAM, LEGISLATION 559-636 (1959). 
!!3. H.R. Doc. No. 342, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). President Eisenhower indicated 
that he would have approved the legislation under other circumstances, but he was 
prevented from endorsing the measure by the gas industry's "arrogant" lobbying while 
the measure was being considered by Congress. 
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With the major advocates of restrictive legislation still in Congress
and likely to remain there for some time,34 and with a man in the
Presidency who issued the Senate Report on the 1949 bill35 and
authored a blistering denunciation of the Phillips holding in
1954,36 the time seems ripe for another effort to give the production
and gathering exemption the effect which Congress has long felt
was originally intended.
Three factors militate against the likelihood of effective legis-
latiqn in this area: (1) the probable reluctance of the President to
give support to a measure which might raise a politically em-
barrassing cry of favoritism, (2) the difficulty of "evicting" an
agency that has already ensconced itself in an area of regulation,
and (3) the highly speculative nature of any prediction of congres-
sional sentiment. Nevertheless, oilmen are encouraged by their
legislative strength, and a veto by President Johnson would seem
unlikely, however strongly he disassociates himself from such a
measure in its earlier stages. If such a bill should be passed and
signed into law, it would seem that the FPC's decision to focus
on the jurisdictional problem in the first place may have been a
chronological error which will jeopardize more effective FPC con-
trol over the independent gas producer in the future.
34. Still in Congress are the co-sponsors of the 1955 bill. Representative Oren
Harris and Senator J. William Fulbright, both Democrats of Arkansas. Representative
Harris was first elected in 1940, and has been re-elected eleven times since. Senator
Fulbright's fourth term began in 1962, which insures his presence in Congress until the
First Session of the Ninety-first Congress.
35. See note 28 supra.
36. "The basic proposition enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court . . . is as clear
as it is shocking and as alarming as it is far-reaching . . . . The majority decision flies
in the face of congressional intent and of past court decisions. There can be no doubt
that Congress never intended the federal regulation of natural gas at the wellhead.
The debates on the subject can be searched in vain for any contrary indication."
Johnson, TJe Phillips Case Decision and the Public Interest, 54 PuB. UTIL. FORT.
473-74 (1954).
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